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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN ] 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff/Cross-
Appellant, ] 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant/Cross-
Respondent . 
• BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT 
> Case No. 860274-CA 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
On November 18, 1986, Defendant and Cross-Respondent 
Mark Douglas Weiner (hereinafter "Mark Weiner") appealed an 
Order on Order to Show Cause signed and entered October 21, 
1986 by the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder 
County, Utah (hereinafter "First District Court"), the 
Honorable Omer J. Call presiding. Mark WeinerTs appeal was 
dismissed by order of this court dated June 9, 1987. On 
November, 26, 1986, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Wendy Marie 
Christensen Rawlings (hereinafter "Wendy Rawlings") cross-
appealed. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this 
matter by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 1 et seq., Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), and Rule 3 R.Utah Ct.App. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Wendy Rawlings cross-appealed Judge Call's October 21, 
1986 Order on Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the 
First District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and enter the 
order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court have jurisdiction? If so, did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in retaining and exercising 
its continuing jurisdiction to modify the parties' divorce 
decree? 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953): 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it such orders in relation to the 
children, property and parties, and the 
maintenance and health care of the parties and 
children, as may be equitable. 
*** 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, and health and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation 
rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives shall take into consideration the 
welfare of the child. 
Applicable sections from the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act: 
Section 78-45c-l. Purposes - Construction. 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: 
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and 
conflict with courts of other states in matters 
of child custody which have in the past resulted 
in the shifting of children from state to state 
with harmful effects on their well-being; 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of 
other states to the end that a custody decree is 
rendered in that state which can best decide the 
case in the interest of the child; 
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(c) assure that litigation concerning the 
custody of a child take place ordinarily in the 
state with which the child and his family have 
the closest connection and where significant 
evidence concerning his care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is most 
readily available, and that courts of this state 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the 
child and his family have a closer connection 
with another state; 
(d) discourage continuing controversies 
over child custody in the interest of greater 
stability of home environment and of secure 
family relationships for the child; 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral 
removals of children undertaken to obtain 
custody awards; 
(f) avoid relitigation of custody 
decisions of other states in this state insofar 
as feasible; 
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody 
decrees of other states; 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of 
information and other forms of mutual assistance 
between the courts of this state and those of 
other states concerned with the same child; and 
(i) to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it. 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote 
the general purposes stated in this section. 
Section 78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to 
decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to 
make a child custody determination by initial or 
modification decree if the conditions as set 
forth in any of the following paragraphs are 
met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state 
of the child at the time of commencement of 
the proceeding, or (i) had been the child's 
home state within six months before 
commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state because of 
his removal or retention by a person 
claiming his custody or for other reasons, 
and a parent or person acting as parent 
continues to live in this state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state assume 
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jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state, and (ii) there is 
available in this state substantial 
evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present 
in this state and (i) the child has been 
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because he 
has been subjected to or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent; or 
(d) (i) It appears that no other 
state would have jurisdiction under 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or 
another state has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that this state 
is the more appropriate forum to determine 
the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in 
the best interest of the child that this 
court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of 
Subsection (1), physical presence in this state 
of the child, or of the child and one of the 
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a 
child custody determination. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while 
desirable, is not a prerequisite for 
jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
Section 78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of 
inconvenient forum--Factors in determination--
Communication with other court--Awarding Costs. 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this 
act to make an initial or modification decree 
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any 
time before making a decree if it finds that it 
is an inconvenient forum to make a custody 
determination under the circumstances of the 
case and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made 
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a 
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party or a guardian ad litem or other 
representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient 
forum, the court shall consider if it is in the 
interest of the child that another state assume 
jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into 
account the following factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was 
the child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer 
connection with the child and his family or with 
the child and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is more 
readily available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another 
forum which is no less appropriate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
court of this state would contravene any of the 
purposes stated in Section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or 
retain jurisdiction the court may communicate 
with a court of another state and exchange 
information pertinent to the assumption of 
jurisdiction by either court with a view to 
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by 
the more appropriate court and that a forum will 
be available to the parties. 
*** 
(9) Any communication received from another 
state informing this state of a finding of 
inconvenient forum because a court of this state 
is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in 
the custody registry of the appropriate court. 
Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this 
state shall inform the original court of this 
fact. 
Section 78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis 
for refusing jurisdiction—Notice to another 
jurisdiction—Ordering petitioner to appear in other 
court or to return child--Awarding costs. 
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has 
wrongfully taken the child from another state or 
has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the 
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for 
purposes of adjudication of custody if this is 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
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(2) Unless required in the interest of the 
child, the court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of 
another state if the petitioner, without consent 
of the person entitled to custody has improperly 
removed the child from the physical custody of 
the person entitled to custody or has improperly 
retained the child after a visit or other 
temporary relinquishment of physical custody. 
If the petitioner has violated any other 
provision of a custody decree of another state 
the court may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under 
the circumstances. 
*** 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the custody decree of 
another state pursuant to Subsection (2) or 
pursuant to Section 78-45c-14, the court shall 
notify the person who has legal custody under 
the decree of the other state and the 
prosecuting attorney of the appropriate 
jurisdiction in the other state and may order 
the petitioner to return the child to the person 
who has legal custody. If it appears that the 
order will be ineffective and the legal 
custodian is ready to receive the child within a 
period of a few days, the court may place the 
child in a foster care home for such period, 
pending return of the child to the legal 
custodian. At the same time, the court shall 
advise the petitioner that any petition for 
modification of custody must be directed to the 
appropriate court of the other state which has 
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that 
that court declines jurisdiction, to a court in 
a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-45c-3. 
*** 
Section 78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decrees. 
The courts of this state shall recognize and 
enforce an initial or modification decree of a 
court of another state which had assumed 
jurisdiction under statutory provisions 
substantially in accordance with this act or 
which was made under factual circumstances 
meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, 
so long as this decree has not been modified in 
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accordance with jurisdictional standards 
substantially similar to those of this act. 
Section 78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree— 
Prerequisites—Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall not 
modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the 
court of this state that the court which 
rendered the decree does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the 
decree and (b) the court of this state has 
jurisdiction. 
(2) If a court of this state is authorized 
under Subsection (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to 
modify a custody decree of another state it 
shall give due consideration to the transcript 
of the record and other documents of all 
previous proceedings submitted to it in 
accordance with Section 78-45c-22. 
28 U.S.C.S. Section 1738A: 
(1) Full faith and credit given to child 
custody determinations 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State 
shall enforce according to its terms, and shall 
not modify except as provided in subsection (f) 
of this section, any child custody determination 
made consistently with the provisions of this 
section by a court of another State. 
*** 
(c) A child custody determination made by a 
court of a State is consistent with the 
provisions of this section only if— 
(1) such court has jurisdiction under 
the law of such State; and 
(2) one of the following conditions 
is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State 
of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or (i) 
had been the child's home State within 
six months before the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from such State 
because of his removal or retention by 
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a contestant or for other reasons, and 
a contestant continues to live in such 
State; 
(B)(i) it appears that no other 
State would have jurisdiction 
under subparagraph (A), and (ii) 
it is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of such State 
assume jurisdiction because (I) 
the child and his parents, or the 
child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant 
connection with such State other 
than mere physical presence in 
such State, and (II) there is 
available in such State 
substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future 
care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; 
(C) the child is physically 
present in such State and (i) the 
child has been abandoned, or (ii) 
it is necessary in an emergency 
to protect the child because he 
has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or 
abuse; 
(D) (i) it appears that no other 
State would have jurisdiction 
under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), 
or (E), or another State has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction 
on the ground that the State 
whose jurisdiction is in issue is 
the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the 
child, and (ii) it is in the best 
interest of the child that such 
court assume jurisdiction; or 
(E) the court has continuing 
jurisdiction pursuant to 
subsection (d) of this section. 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State 
which has made a child custody determination 
consistently with the provisions of this section 
continues as long as the requirement of 
subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to 
be met and such State remains the residence of 
the child or of any contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody determination is 
made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be 
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heard shall be given to the contestants, any 
parent whose parental rights have not been 
previously terminated and any person who has 
physical custody of a child. 
(f) A court of a State may modify a 
determination of the custody of the same child 
made by a court of another State, if— 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a 
child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer 
has jurisdiction, or it has declined to 
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination. 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise 
jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody 
determination commenced during the pendency of a 
proceeding in a court of another State where 
such court of that other State is exercising 
jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of 
this Section to make a custody determination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
The Order on Order to Show Cause from which Wendy 
Rawlings cross-appealed made numerous rulings: held Wendy 
Rawlings in contempt for her failure to obey a previous order 
of the Court requiring her to use the Weiner name for the 
children; required counseling for the parties and the 
children; set out guidelines for visitation and phone calls 
with the children; awarded Mark Weiner joint custody of his 
children with primary physical custody to Wendy Rawlings and 
carefully defined visitation to Mark Weiner; as well as making 
orders on several other matters. The order contained twenty 
paragraphs, nearly all of which ruled on a different aspect of 
the case. 
In her statement on the nature of the proceedings, 
Wendy Rawlings incorrectly characterized the Order on Order to 
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Show Cause as only changing custody of the parties' children 
to Mark Weiner. The Order on Order to Show Cause only awards 
joint custody while leaving the primary residence of the 
children with Wendy Rawlings. As stated above, the Order on 
Order to Show Cause also covered several matters in addition 
to the joint custody award. 
2. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition at Trial 
Court. 
Wendy Rawlings1 statements on these points are accurate 
as far as they go. However, a long history of proceedings in 
the First District Court predates the Order on Order to Show 
Cause from which Wendy Rawlings takes her cross-appeal. The 
history will be as briefly stated as possible in the Statement 
of Facts below. 
3. Statement of Facts. 
A rendition by Mark Weiner of the facts in this case in 
addition to the facts stated by Wendy Rawlings is necessary 
for two reasons: (1) the facts stated in Wendy Rawlings' 
brief are not tied to the record as required by Rule 24(e) 
R.Utah Ct.App.; and (2) Wendy Rawlings' Statements of Facts 
did not include several facts essential to the deciding of 
this appeal. A response on several facts stated by Wendy 
Rawlings is also necessary as those facts are not properly 
before this Court. The response is set out in Argument III at 
page 39 herein. 
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Concurrent with the filing of this brief, Mark Weiner 
filed a motion to supplement the record in this case. 
Assuming this Court will allow Mark Weiner?s motion, but not 
yet having a numbered record to refer to, many of the facts 
stated herein are referenced to original pleadings in the 
trial court file by title of the pleading and date filed. 
1. Mark Weiner and Wendy Rawlings were married August 
16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children as 
issue of their marriage: Mark Christian Weiner; America 
Jerusha Weiner; Samuel Nathan Weiner; Esther Noel Weiner; and 
Joseph Todd Weiner. (Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, paragraphs 3 and 4, filed 9/27/82.) 
2. On November 17, 1981, Wendy Rawlings (then Wendy 
Weiner) filed in the First District Court for a divorce from 
her husband, Mark Weiner. At the time of filing, the 
children's ages ranged from 6 years old to 1 month old. 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 1 
and 4, filed 9/27/82.) 
3. After a trial on May 6, 1982, before Judge Call, 
the parties were divorced on May 18, 1982. An original decree 
was entered at that time but later amended on September 27, 
1987. The Amended Decree provided that Wendy Rawlings be 
awarded custody of the parties' children. Mark Weiner was 
awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with his 
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children. (Amended Decree of Divorce, paragraph 2, filed 
9/27/82.) 
4. On November 3, 1982, Mark Weiner filed an Affidavit 
and Motion for Order to Show Cause alleging Wendy Rawlings' 
disregarding of the visitation provisions of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce. The Court signed an Order to Show Cause. 
(Affidavit, filed 11/3/82; Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
filed 11/3/82; and Order to Show Cause filed 11/10/82.) 
5. On November 8, 1982, Wendy Rawlings filed an Order 
to Show Cause, Motion for More Definite Statement, and 
Petition for Modification of Decree (all filed 11/8/82). 
6. Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause was heard 
November 8, 1982. Judge Call admonished the parties "to live 
in accordance with the visitation order as presently set forth 
by the Court," rejected Wendy Rawlings1 Motion for More 
Definite Statement, and ordered a trial date be set to hear 
Wendy Rawlings1 Order to Show Cause and Petition for 
Modification requests. No hearing was ever held on Wendy 
Rawlings1 Order to Show Cause and Petition for Modification. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to 
Show Cause filed 11/17/82.) 
7. On December 13, 1982 a hearing was held in front of 
Judge Call for the purpose of interpreting the Amended Decree 
of Divorce as to Christmas visitation. Judge Call hand-wrote 
on the Order entered December 22, 1982 that "any Law 
Enforcement officer is hereby requested and authorized to 
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assist if needed in carrying out this Order. Dec. 22, 1982 
Omer J. Call, Dist. Judge." (Order, filed 12/22/82.) 
8. On May 9, 1983 a hearing was held on an Order to 
Show Cause filed by Mark Weiner. Judge Call had before him 
family studies by Dr. T. Brent Price (hired by Mark Weiner) 
and Dr. Kim Openshaw (hired by Wendy Rawlings). In the Order 
on Order to Show Cause, Judge Call again ruled: "That the 
visitation schedule as set forth in the Amended Decree of 
Divorce entered on the 25th day of September, 1982, be 
strictly adhered to by the parties." (Order on Order to Show 
Cause, filed 5/16/83.) 
9. As part of the 12/22/82 order, Mark Weiner was 
ordered to submit to a home study to be arranged by Wendy 
Rawlings. (Order, paragraph 3, filed 12/22/82.) 
10. On December 23, 1982, Wendy Rawlings married Mark 
Rawlings. 
11. On October 18, 1983, a hearing was held before 
Judge Call on Mark Weiner?s request that there be counseling 
for the parties1 children. Dr. T. Brent Price testified. 
Judge Call found the following: 
1. That hostility and disappointment which 
(Wendy Rawlings) feels toward Defendant is being 
allowed to upset the children. 
2. That Plaintiff has concluded that she 
and her present husband provide a new set of 
parents for the minor children of the parties, 
with the ultimate authority in Plaintiff and in 
Plaintiff's present husband, which conclusion is 
not in the best interests of the children. 
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3. That it is in the best interests of the 
children to require Plaintiff and her present 
husband and the children to obtain family 
therapy. 
4. That based upon the recommendations of 
Dr. T. Brent Price and Drs. Fairbank and 
Openshaw in a letter, in testimony by Dr. Price 
and in a letter presented to the Court, the 
Court recommends that therapy of Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff's present husband, and the minor 
children of the parties be had through either 
Dr. Meredith Alden, Dr. Curtis Canning, or Dr. 
William Dobson. 
*** 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to 
Show Cause, filed 2/16/84.) 
12. At the proceedings on October 18, 1983, Judge Call 
made the following comments from the bench: 
*** 
Now, it's true you were awarded custody, 
Mrs. Rawlings. But you won't find anything in 
my decree, in any order I've issued, in anything 
else that's come out of this court that 
displaces Mark Weiner as the father of these 
children. Now, the fact that you married Mark 
Rawlings didn't alter in the slightest the 
paternity nor the paternal rights. 
Now, I can see that you, either because of 
your training or something else, have decided 
that, in the best interest of these children, 
that they immediately learn that there is a new 
father figure in your home. You don't find 
anything in the decree or any order of this 
court to that effect. I'm not prepared to say 
that. And I have never said it. None of the 
psychologists have said it. They recognize that 
the new husband may well have a role. I may 
even be required to impose some discipline as 
the breadwinner or the provider to some extent. 
But in this case none of that deprives the 
father, the natural father, of his role as 
father. But I find from everything that has 
gone on here that you have concluded that you 
and Mark Rawlings are now the parents. You and 
Mark Rawlings have the responsibility to dictate 
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what is best for the children. You and Mark 
Rawlings have the right to say what is best for 
the children. 
I have to dispose your mind of that. That 
isn't the case. He has some visitation 
privileges and custodial rights while they are 
with him. And in the absence of harm or 
upsetting circumstances, it's not your problem 
that the children sleep in a sleeping bag. It's 
not your problem that all of the children end up 
in the same room in one night. I'd be surprised 
if they didn't. If you're able to carry on an 
activity in one room and put the children in 
another room, you're lucky. All the kids want 
to be where the action is. When they go to bed 
I'm not alarmed at that. Apparently the 
psychologist isn't alarmed at that. Don't 
decide that you, then, have got to arrange the 
physical set up over at the Weiner home. 
*** 
(Partial Transcript of Proceedings held 10/18/83, filed 
11/22/83.) 
13. On May 29, 1984, Judge Call entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order on Order to Show 
Cause on a hearing held before him on April 6, 1984 on an 
Order to Show Cause initiated by Mark Weiner. The Court's 
edict was the same: 
1. That the visitation of the children by 
[Mark Weiner] be as specifically stated in the 
Amended Divorce Decree. There are to be no 
changes in the visitation as specifically set 
forth in the Amended Divorce Decree except by 
mutual agreement of the parties. In the case 
where the children are sick, the keeping of the 
children from visitation by [Wendy Rawlings] 
must be supported by a doctor's statement that 
the child is in fact unable to go to visitation. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to 
Show Cause, filed 5/29/84.) 
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14. On June 22, 1984, a letter from Wendy Rawlings and 
her husband, Mr. Mark Rawlings, was filed with the Court. The 
letter stated: 
Dear Mr. Weiner: 
Mark has accepted employment in the Des Moines 
area, so we have moved. Our forwarding address 
is: Mark Rawlings, P. 0. Box 477, Brigham City, 
Utah 84302. 
We will contact you to make suitable visitation 
modifications. 
With Best Wishes, 
Mark and Wendy Rawlings 
(Letter, filed 6/22/84.) 
15. During the summer of 1984, multiple Motions for 
Orders to Show Cause were filed by Mark Weiner and multiple 
Orders to Show Cause were signed by the Court attempting to 
find the whereabouts of Wendy Rawlings and the children. In 
an August 8, 1984 Order, Judge Call extended indefinitely Mark 
Weiner?s summer visitation with the children pending Wendy 
Rawlings providing Mark Weiner a residential address at which 
Wendy Rawlings and the children resided. (Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, Affidavit, and Order to Show Cause, filed 7/16/84; 
Motion for Order to Show Cause, Order to Show Cause and 
Temporary Order, and Order for Service, filed 7/26/84; Order, 
filed 8/8/84.) 
16. On October 23, 1984, a hearing was held before 
Judge Call on an Order to Show Cause initiated by Mark Weiner, 
and an Order to Show Cause filed by Wendy Rawlings. Besides 
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the parties, Sheila Miller of Bear River Mental Health and Dr. 
Kim Openshaw, both child counselors, testified. On December 
17, 1984, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Order to Show Cause were entered on the October 23, 
1984 hearing. The trial court found that where Wendy Rawlings 
had moved herself and the children some 800 miles, the move 
constituted a substantial change in circumstances upon which 
the Court modified the visitation. The Court provided for 
visitation by the maternal grandparents when the children were 
in Brigham City, where their grandparents live. Further, the 
Court found that "it is not in the best interests of the 
children nor of their father, Mr. Weiner, that the children be 
called Rawlings. Accordingly, only the Weiner name should be 
used." (Clerk's Minute Entry, filed 10/23/84; Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to order to Show Cause, 
filed 12/17/84. ) 
17. On September 17, 1985, upon motion and affidavit 
of Mark Weiner (Mark Weiner was representing himself at this 
point), Judge Call signed an order providing that Wendy 
Rawlings provide Mark Weiner "with the address of the new 
domicile of the minor children of the parties and with the new 
phone number at said domicile" and that child support be held 
by the Clerk of the Court until the new address and phone 
number were provided. On an October 10, 1985 letter to the 
Clerk from Stephen W. Jewell, Wendy Rawlings' counsel, Judge 
Call noted: "Sharon you can release the current checks to 
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Wendy's parents. Oct. 16th-85. O.J.C." (Order, filed 
9/17/85; Letter, filed 10/15/85.) 
18. On October 23, 1985, Mark Weiner filed his Motion 
for Order to Show Cause and Temporary Order and Affidavit in 
support thereof. (Motion for Order to Show Cause and 
Affidavit, filed 10/23/85.) 
19. On or about November 5, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed 
a Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction From Utah to Washington 
State. (Motion of Petitioner for Transfer of Jurisdiction 
from Utah to Washington, filed 11/18/85.) Apparently relying 
on the motion filed in Washington, Wendy Rawlings filed a 
memorandum with the First Judicial District Court in Box Elder 
County, Utah. (Record, page 1.) 
20. On December 18, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Judge Call, with a certificate by 
counsel, Stephen Jewell, and Affidavit of Wendy Rawlings in 
support of the motion. (Record, pages 12-18.) 
21. On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a Statement 
and Order and certified the matters of disqualification and 
jurisdictional to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First 
Judicial Court for Utah for determination. (Record, pages 26-
28. There is a copy of the Statement and Order in the 
Addendum.) 
22. Responding to the disqualification claim, Judge 
Call summarized the case: 
(a) That numerous documents appearing to 
be letters or statements of both parties, 
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requests and reports have been presented to the 
Judge's secretary and the clerks of court, all 
of which the Judge has declined to receive or 
review, but has ordered the same returned or 
held in a separate file by the secretary; 
(b) The Judge has further refused to 
accept phone calls or otherwise discuss or meet 
with the defendant; 
(c) That the Judge has advised the 
secretary and court clerks that the defendant 
would have to comply with applicable procedures, 
including notice to the opposing party in order 
to bring his requests before the court. 
After numerous hearings dating from the 
year 1981, the court has entered a decree, 
amended decree, and several orders on orders to 
show cause, the effect of which was to fix 
rights of visitation for defendant with his 
children, including weekly short telephone 
visits at defendant's expense which required 
plaintiff's keeping defendant apprised of her 
phone number and residence. Contrary thereto 
plaintiff and prior to the current disputes, 
notified defendant that her address was P. 0. 
Box 477, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and contact 
would be made to make suitable visitation 
modifications. Thereafter plaintiff notified 
the clerk's office to forward child support to 
Wendell Christensen, 519 Hawthorne Drive, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302. That on August 8, 
1984 the court entered its order requiring 
plaintiff to provide an address where plaintiff 
resided and could be served personally and where 
defendant may visit the minor children of the 
parties On September 17, 1985 (see Document No. 
16868-83), pursuant to affidavit and motions, 
the court ordered child support payments held by 
the clerk until plaintiff provided the court and 
the defendant the address and phone number of 
the children. After some delay and receipt of 
letters stating why the addresses and phone 
numbers should not be given, plaintiff did 
provide the court clerks such address and phone 
number and the court directed the support 
payments be forwarded to her. 
(Record, pages 26-28; Addendum.) 
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23. Regarding the jurisdiction issue, Judge Call 
documented his phone conversation with Commissioner Gaddis of 
Washington State in the Statement and Order: 
That pursuant to the plaintiff's earlier 
motion made in the State of Washington for 
transfer of jurisdiction to the State of 
Washington and the request contained therein 
that the Washington Court communicate with Judge 
Omer J. Call, Box Elder County, Commissioner 
Gaddis of the said Washington Court contacted 
this court declining to accept jurisdiction, 
noted the problems the minor children were 
having because of the visitation fights, and 
urged this court to retain jurisdiction for the 
purpose of enforcing, adjusting or modifying 
custody and visitation orders. 
(Record, page 28; Addendum.) 
24. Judge Christoffersen denied Wendy Rawlings' 
Motions to Dismiss Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause, Motion 
to Disqualify Judge Call, and Motion to Change Jurisdiction. 
(Record, page 68.) 
25. On January 20, 1986, the Order Declining 
Jurisdiction from Washington was filed. The order, after 
acknowledging a hearing in Washington on the issue of 
jurisdiction and communication with Judge Call, stated: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that this court finds that the custody and 
visitation of the children subject to this 
proceeding has also been subject to the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Box Elder County 
District Court of the State of Utah; that said 
court acquired jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter several years ago and has 
continuously exercised jurisdiction in 
enforcement and modification proceedings; and 
that one of the named parties, father of the 
children, continues to reside in the State of 
Utah; that upon communication with said court it 
has elected and determined to continue 
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exercising sole and exclusive child custody 
jurisdiction; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 
26:27) it is determined that Box Elder County 
District Court of the State of Utah continues to 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over 
the custody and visitation of the parties' 
children, the parties not having agreed to 
litigate exclusively in the State of Washington 
and there being no emergency justifying 
intervention in the matter by Washington Courts; 
and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington 
proceedings concerning the custody of said 
children are hereby stayed until further order 
of the court or until an appropriate motion for 
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of 
Washington and this proceeding shall remain open 
for enforcement provisions of such orders as 
have been and may be entered by the Box Elder 
County District Court of the State of Utah 
pursuant to the provisions of the UCCJA. 
The order was signed on January 13, 1986. (Record, pages 70-
72. There is a copy of the Order Declining Custody in the 
Addendum.) 
26. After discovery and various other motions, the 
hearing on Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause was heard by 
Judge Call on May 21, 22 and 27, 1987. The Clerk's Minute 
Entry shows that Judge Call heard testimony from: the 
parties; Mark Rawlings; Mark Rawlings' former wife, Judy 
Evans; Nels Sather of Bear River Mental Health; Dr. Thomas 
Charles Fairbanks, a psychologist; Dr. Kim Openshaw, a 
psychologist from Utah State University; Dr. Jack M. Reiter, 
psychiatrist from the Seattle, Washington area; Dr. Elliott 
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Landau, a psychologist from the University of Utah; and 
Wendell and Rosalie Christensen, maternal grandparents of the 
children and residents of Box Elder County. Judge Call 
interviewed the children in chambers. Numerous exhibits were 
presented and received by the trial court, including copies of 
several psychologists' reports and court documents from 
Washington State. (Record, pages 313-319; Exhibits #01-18.) 
27. Wendy Rawlings filed an Order to Show Cause 
against Mark Weiner on October 16, 1986. (Record, page 336.) 
28. On October 21, 1986, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Mark Weinerfs Order to Show 
Cause were signed and entered by Judge Call. (Record, pages 
338-347.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Having heard the original divorce of the parties 
in 1982 and several orders to show cause prior to the Order to 
Show Cause filed in October, 1985, which is the subject of 
this appeal, the First District Court had continuing 
jurisdiction of this case. 
2. Where Mark Weiner has never moved from the state 
and the children continue to have significant contacts with 
Utah and substantial evidence concerning their interests is 
available in Utah, the requirements of Utah UCCJA and FPKPA 
are fully satisfied. Being fully satisfied, the First 
District Court properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction 
in this case. 
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3. Whether or not to retain jurisdiction was in the 
discretion of the First District Court. There being no abuse 
of that discretion, the First District Court should be 
affirmed on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Wendy Rawlings' cross-appeal in this case claims the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the October 21, 1986 
Order on Order to Show Cause. Wendy Rawlings did not appeal 
the substance of the decision. 
To argue the jurisdiction issue requires a step-by-step 
analysis. The analysis necessarily includes a discussion of 
the trial court's basic jurisdictional authority in this case, 
the effect of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(hereinafter "Utah UCCJA") and the Federal Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (hereinafter "FPKPA") on the trial court's 
authority, and the trial court's exercise of discretion 
relative to jurisdiction in this case. In short, did the 
trial court have jurisdiction and was the trial court 
authorized to exercise that jurisdiction. 
I 
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HAD JURISDICTION TO SIGN AND 
ENTER THE ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN THIS 
CASE. 
On September 27, 1982, the Amended Decree of Divorce 
between Wendy Rawlings and Mark Weiner was filed. The Amended 
Decree provided that custody of the parties' five small 
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children go to Wendy Rawlings, with carefully outlined 
visitation to Mark Weiner. 
Before and after the filing of the Amended Decree, Mark 
Weiner has sought the aid of the court in compelling Wendy 
Rawlings to honor the visitation order and allow the children 
and their father their visitation time together. 
Having heard and decided the divorce of the parties, 
the First District Court has "continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to ... the 
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care ... as shall be reasonable and 
necessary." Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
Numerous subsequent orders were made in this case by the trial 
court, including the Order on Order to Show Cause entered 
October 21, 1986, all of which were entered under the First 
District Court's continuing jurisdiction. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN 
THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UTAH UCCJA AND 
FPKPA. 
In October, 1985, the trial court signed an Order to 
Show Cause pursuant to a Motion and Affidavit filed by Mark 
Weiner. The Order to Show Cause sought modification of the 
Amended Decree and/or enforcement of the numerous previous 
orders of the trial court relative to visitation, the proper 
surname of the children, visitation expenses and so on. 
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In November, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed a motion in 
Washington State seeking to have Mark Weiner's Order to Show 
Cause heard in Washington. Pursuant to Wendy Rawlings1 
request, Washington Court Commissioner, Stephen M. Gaddis, 
spoke on the phone with District Judge Omer J. Call. 
Both Commissioner Gaddis in his Order Declining 
Jurisdiction and Judge Call in his Statement and Order 
acknowledge the continual exercise of jurisdiction in this 
case by the First District Court beginning with the filing of 
the divorce complaint filed by Wendy Rawlings in 1981. 
(Record, pages 70-71 and 26-28 respectively.) Commissioner 
Gaddis' order acknowledges Mark Weiner's continued residence 
in this state. Judge Call's order points out Wendy Rawlings1 
failure to keep Mark Weiner informed of the children's 
whereabouts and phone number. Both orders clearly confirm the 
First District Court's continuing jurisdiction in this case 
and the intent of both courts that the First District Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction concerning custody and visitation. 
Every procedure mandated and envisioned by the Utah 
UCCJA was correctly followed in this case. 
The first provisions of the Utah UCCJA which should be 
considered in this case are Sections 78-45c-13 and 14. 
Section 78-45c-13 requires the "recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decrees." Section 78-45c-14 sets out the 
prerequisites for modification of a foreign decree. 
Commissioner Gaddis correctly concluded in his order declining 
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custody, pursuant to Section 78-45c-14(l)(a) "that the court 
which rendered the decree (First District Court) does ... now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act ... (and did not 
decline) to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree ... ." 
To determine what is meant by the first provision of 
Section 78-45c-14(1)(a), it is necessary to review the 
Commissioner's notes, other portions of UCCJA, and applicable 
case law. The Commissioner's note to Section 13 of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter the 
"UCCJA") (virtually identical to Section 78-45c-13) states: 
This section and sections 14 and 15 are the 
key provisions which guarantee a great measure 
of security and stability of environment to the 
"interstate child" by discouraging relitigations 
in other states. See Section 1 ... . 
*** 
"Jurisdiction" or "jurisdictional 
standards" under this section refers to the 
requirements of section 3 in the case of initial 
decrees and to the requirements of sections 3 
and 14 in the case of modification decrees. The 
section leaves open the possibility of 
discretionary recognition of custody decrees of 
other states beyond the enumerated situations of 
mandatory acceptance. 
*** 
9 U.Laws Annot. (1979 ed.) Section 13, page 151. 
Section 1 of UCCJA (virtually identical to Section 78-
45c-l) states the general purposes of the UCCJA. (Section 78-
45c-l is reproduced in the "statutes" section of this brief.) 
The general purposes of the Utah UCCJA were met by the trial 
court retaining jurisdiction in this case because 
"jurisdictional competition and conflict" with Washington was 
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avoided, cooperation with the Washington court was promoted, 
litigation over custody and visitation took place in the state 
where the children have significant contacts with their 
father, maternal grandparents, numerous aunts and cousins, and 
counselors and psychologists, continuing controversies 
involving custody and visitation and continued attempts to 
forum-shop and relitigate custody and visitation was 
discouraged• 
The "jurisdictional standards" referred to in the 
Commissioner's notes on Section 13 are more fully discussed in 
the Commissioner's note on Section 14: 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts in 
other states have in the past often assumed 
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state decree 
themselves without regard to the preexisting 
jurisdiction of the other state. *** In order to 
achieve greater stability of custody 
arrangements and avoid forum shopping, 
subsection (a) declares that other states will 
defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court of another state as long as that state has 
jurisdiction under the standards of this Act. 
In other words, all petitions for modification 
are to be addressed to the prior state if that 
state has sufficient contact with the case to 
satisfy section 3. The fact that the court had 
previously considered the case may be one factor 
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If, 
however, all the persons involved have moved 
away or the contact with the state has otherwise 
become slight, modification jurisdiction would 
shift elsewhere. 
The First District Court has continuing jurisdiction 
under Section 30-3-5. The First District Court exercised that 
jurisdiction nearly continuously since Wendy Rawlings filed 
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the complaint in 1981. Though Wendy Rawlings moved with her 
new husband and the children out of Box Elder County, Mark 
Weiner still resides in Box Elder County, exercises much of 
his rather extensive visitation in Box Elder County, the 
maternal grandparents reside in Box Elder County, counselors 
to the children and parties work and reside in Utah. The 
children's contacts with this state continues to be 
significant, and were certainly so in 1985-86 at the time the 
order to show cause was brought, heard, and decided. 
The Commissioner's note refers to Section 3. The 
statutory cite in the Utah UCCJA is Section 78-45c-3. Section 
78-45c-3(l)(b) provides that the court has jurisdiction in a 
modification petition in child custody matters if it is in the 
child's best interest by virtue of the child and one of the 
contesting parties having "a significant connection with this 
state" and "there is available in this state substantial 
evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships." Section 
78-45c-3(2) and (3) makes clear that physical presence of the 
child is not the sole determining factor under Section 78-45c-
3(l)(b). 
Section 78-45c-8 provides that a court may decline 
jurisdiction if a petitioner does not have "clean hands." 
Section 78-45c-8(2) provides: "If the petitioner has violated 
any other provision of a custody decree of another state the 
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just 
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and proper under the circumstances." There are several 
expressions of concern by the trial court for the well being 
of the children in light of Wendy Rawlings' conduct. 
Specifically, the various orders on orders to show cause and 
notations thereon, the Statement and Order, and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to Show 
Cause appealed from to this Court. 
The FPKPA (which is essentially the last word on full 
faith and credit of custody orders in this country) requires 
that full faith and credit be given to a custody order made by 
a state which "has jurisdiction under the law of such state" 
(28 U.S.C.S. Section 1738A(c)(1)), the state has continuing 
jurisdiction (Section 1738A(E)) and the state "remains the 
residence of the child or any contestant" (Section 1738A(d)). 
Again, under Section 30-3-5, the First District Court 
has continuing jurisdiction. Mark Weiner continues to reside 
in this state. Where those two elements are present, under 
FPKPA, Judge Call's Order on Order to Show Cause is entitled 
to full faith and credit. 
FPKPA goes even further than requiring full faith and 
credit to a sister state's order. FPKPA also restricts the 
right of a sister state to modify the decree between the 
parties in this case until Mark Weiner moves and the First 
Judicial District otherwise loses jurisdiction of the case 
through the loss of all significant contacts with the 
children. 
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There are several well-considered cases which support 
the above analysis: 
In State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d (Tenn. 
1985), the parties were divorced in 1980 by an Indiana court. 
The parties and the children had lived in Indiana many years. 
The day after the divorce the mother moved to Tennessee. 
Shortly after the divorce the father moved the Indiana court 
for modification of the decree relative to custody of the 
child in the mother's care. The mother later moved the 
Tennessee court for modification of the decree relative to the 
visitation of the Indiana decree. The Tennessee judge took 
jurisdiction of both the father's and mother's petitions. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that 
though Tennessee was the "home State" of the child under the 
Tennessee version of UCCJA," the fact that a state is or has 
become a 'home state' does not, in and of itself, give that 
state authority to pre-empt the authority of other states." 
688 S.W.2d at 824. Relying on Tennessee's equivalent to 
Utah's Section 78-45c-14(1), the Commissioner's notes to 
Section 14, quoted above, and Steele v. Steele, 250 Ga.101, 
296 S.E.2d 570 (1982), the Court concluded: 
There can be no question but that the intention 
of the drafters of the Uniform Act was to give 
priority to the original rendering state, and 
not to other states, so long as at least one of 
the contestants to the original action remained 
in that state, and the state otherwise retained 
j urisdiction. 
688 S.W.2d at 825. 
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee then quoted extensively 
from a law review article by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, the 
Reporter who aided in the preparation of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act. Bodenheimer "The Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children 
Caught in the Conflict of Laws," 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207 (1969). 
Of particular interest is an example quoted from the article: 
A typical example is the case of the couple who 
are divorced in state A, their matrimonial home 
state, and whose children are awarded to the 
wife, subject to visitation rights of the 
husband. Wife and children move to state B, 
with or without permission of the court to 
remove the children. State A has continuing 
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may not 
hear the wife's petition to make her the sole 
custodian, eliminate visitation rights, or make 
any other modification of the decree, even 
though state B has in the meantime become the 
'home state' under section 3. The jurisdiction 
of state A continues and is exclusive as long as 
the husband lives in state A unless he loses 
contact with the children, for example, by not 
using his visitation privileges for three years. 
Bodenheimer, op.cit.supra at 1237. 
688 S.W.2d at 826. 
After citing the FPKPA, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
held in the case that until Indiana declined jurisdiction, 
"primary jurisdiction to modify the Indiana decree remains 
with the Indiana courts, not with the Tennessee courts, even 
though this has become the 'home state' of the child whose 
custody is involved." Ibid. 
In Kumar v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 32 
Cal.3d 689, 186 Cal.Rptr. 772, 652 P.2d 1003 (1982), the 
Supreme Court of California held that the California courts 
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could not modify a New York decree unless New York declined to 
exercise jurisdiction. In that case, the parties were 
divorced in New York in 1974. The parties continued to live 
in New York until 1979 when the mother, who had custody, moved 
with the child to California. In 1980, the father filed in 
New York for modification of the decree. Shortly thereafter, 
the mother petitioned a California court for modification. 
In a lengthy, scholarly, and very helpful opinion, the 
California court cites sections from its version of UCCJA, 
Commissioners Notes, also quoted at length herein, three of 
Reporter Bodenheimerfs law review articles on UCCJA, including 
the quote from the Vanderbilt Law Review, and FPKPA. 
Acknowledging California to be the "home state," the 
California court nevertheless ruled that the child and child's 
father had significant contacts with New York and there was 
substantial evidence concerning the child in New York. In 
support of its decision, the California court noted that: The 
child was born and lived in New York until moving to 
California; the divorce and initial custody decree were 
rendered by New York; the child had continued contact with his 
father who continued to live in New York; "maternal 
grandparents and other relations, neighbors and friends live 
in New York;" and there was evidence the mother left with the 
child for California without providing an address or phone 
number to the father or making arrangements for visitation by 
the father with the child. 652 P.2d at L004-5. 
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The above facts are nearly identical to the facts in 
this case. 
The Supreme Court of California held that "... 
California has no authority to modify the New York decree so 
long as that state has jurisdiction and does not decline to 
exercise it ... ." The First District Court of Utah had 
jurisdiction to enter the Order on Order to Show Cause and did 
not relinquish its jurisdiction to do so. 
In Cotter and Woods, 64 Or.App. 173, 666 P.2d 1382 
(Or.App. 1983), the Oregon courts refused to modify a 
California decree even though Oregon was the "home state." 
Subsequent to the California divorce, the father filed for 
modification of the decree in California and later obtained an 
order of joint custody of the child with the physical custody 
to the mother and specific visitation to the father. The 
mother moved to Oregon between the time the modification 
petition was filed and decided. Approximately 7 to 8 months 
later, the mother petitioned an Oregon court to modify the 
California decree. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon, citing Oregon's version 
of UCCJA, ruled that though Oregon was the "home state," 
California still had jurisdiction where one of the contestants 
was still living in California and there was a "'substantial 
connection1 between the child, father and California." 
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Again, Mark Weiner still resides in Utah and the 
substantial connection between the children, Mark Weiner, and 
Utah continues. 
In yet another lengthy, scholarly, and helpful 
decision, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a decision 
by the trial court to dismiss a petition for modification of a 
Florida decree even though Connecticut was the "home state." 
Brown v. Brown, 195 Conn. 98, 486 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1986). 
What is further interesting about the case is the petition for 
modification was dismissed even though Florida's "Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction" provided that Florida would 
"resume jurisdiction over this dispute 'should the courts of 
the State of Connecticut express their willingness that this 
be done.'" 486 A.2d at 1125. 
The requirements of UCCJA and FPKPA were met in this 
case. The First District Court had jurisdiction and properly 
exercised its jurisdiction to hear and enter the Order on 
Order to Show Cause. 
Wendy Rawlings cites several cases in support of her 
position that the First District Court had no jurisdiction or 
at least should not have exercised its jurisdiction. The 
first case was Etter v. Etter, 45 Md.App. 395, 405 A.2d 760 
(1979). Etter, supra, involved parties who weren't even 
divorced yet. Initial custody orders and modifications of 
existing custody orders require wholly different analyses 
under UCCJA and FPKPA. See generally Kumar v. Superior Court 
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of Santa Clara County, supra, and analysis therein. Since 
this case involves a modification and in Etter, supra, there 
was as yet no decree, Etter, supra/ is not relevant to this 
case. 
Green v. Green, 87 Mich.App. 706, 276 N.W.2d 472 
(1978), favors Mark Weiner's position as the Michigan court 
allowed jurisdiction only after the Texas court that issued 
the original decree relinquished its jurisdiction in the case. 
The First District Court never relinquished its jurisdiction 
in this case. 
Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976), 
is distinguishable from this case as Oregon took jurisdiction 
of a modification request only after it determined that 
Indiana, the state that issued the divorce decree, had no 
"significant connection" with the children or substantial 
evidence" about the children. Both are present in this case. 
In addition, there is no mention of correspondence with the 
Indiana court in Settle, supra. The mother did not attend the 
trial in Indiana as she had already moved to Oregon with the 
children of whom she had an order of temporary custody. The 
Oregon court's finding that the Indiana decree was punitive, 
the kids had never been in the custody of their father, and 
there was no significant contacts or substantial evidence in 
Indiana, formed the basis of Oregon's jurisdiction, none of 
which is present in the case before this Court. 
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In McCarron v. District Court in and for Jefferson 
County, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983), both parties had left the 
state where the original decree was rendered. Mark Weiner has 
never moved. Though Commissioner's notes to Section 14 of the 
UCCJA indicate when both parties move the state may lose 
jurisdiction, that is not the case here. McCarron, supra, is 
not relevant in this case. 
As to McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977), the 
case is pre-Utah UCCJA and would necessitate an entirely 
different analyses, if not result, if UCCJA was applicable. 
The last case, Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1987), is discussed in Argument III below. 
Ill 
WHETHER OR NOT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER 
UTAH UCCJA IS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE FIRST 
DISTRICT COURT. 
In this case it is apparent that Judge Call and 
Commissioner Gaddis determined that the First District Court 
exercise its jurisdiction and hear and decide the several 
matters raised by Mark Weinerfs Order to Show Cause of 
October, 1985. Judge Call's Statement and Order and 
Commissioner Gaddis' Order Declining Jurisdiction appear in 
the record and so state that the First District Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction. After receiving the go ahead from 
Judge Christoffersen by virtue of Judge Christoffersen1s 
memorandum decision of December 23, 1985, Judge Call went on 
to exercise the jurisdiction of his court. 
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In Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Fourth 
District Court exercised its continuing jurisdiction to 
enforce the visitation provisions of a divorce decree it had 
issued some years prior. Evidence was noted by the Utah 
Supreme Court that the children had not lived in Utah since 
before their mother was served with the divorce complaint. 
Though the Supreme Court essentially ruled Utah UCCJA did not 
apply to the case, the Court noted in reference to Section 78-
45e-7 that: "Application of the foregoing factors to the 
facts and circumstances of this case leads to the conclusion 
that the court did not abuse its authority in declining to 
relinquish jurisdiction." 
The use of the words "abuse its authority11 suggests the 
Utah Supreme Court allows the trial court to exercise the same 
discretion in applying Utah UCCJA as is allowed in divorce and 
modifications generally. The standard of review of divorce 
modifications is outlined in Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 
277, 488 P.2d 308, 309 (1971): 
This proceeding seeking to modify the divorce 
decree is in equity; and it is the prerogative 
of this court to review the evidence, to make 
its own findings, and to substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court when the ends of 
justice so require. However, due to the 
prerogatives and advantaged position of the 
trial court, we pursue that broad authorization 
under certain rules of review which are now well 
established: Its actions are indulged with a 
presumption of validity and correctness and the 
burden is upon the appellant to show a basis for 
upsetting them: either (1) that findings have 
been made when the evidence clearly 
preponderates the other way, or (2) that there 
has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
-37-
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error; or (3) that it appears plainly that there 
has been such an abuse of discretion that an 
inequity or injustice has resulted. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
Citing Connecticut's equivalent provision to Utah's 
Section 78-45c-7(l) and the word "may," the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut ruled in Brown, supra; 
Declining jurisdiction under Section 46b-97 is 
discretionary with the court. By the inclusion 
of the word "may" in that section, the 
legislature clearly intended that the 
inconvenient forum issue in UCCJA cases remain 
discretionary; as is the common law forum non 
conveniens principle. This discretion must be 
exercised in accordance with the overall 
purposes of the UCCJA; see General Statutes 
Section 46b-91; which have been summarized by 
some courts as consisting of the elimination of 
"jurisdictional fishing with children as bait." 
A determination by the court under Section 46b-
97 that Connecticut "is an inconvenient forum to 
make a custody determination under the 
circumstances of the case and that a court of 
another state is a more appropriate forum"; 
General Statutes Section 46b-97(a); will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
This standard of review is necessary in order to 
"discourage continuing controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of 
home environment and of secure family 
relationships for the child." 
486 S.2d at 1116 (a substantial number of case and statutory 
citations are omitted). 
The First District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in retaining jurisdiction in this case. 
As further suggested by Trent, supra, the burden was on 
Wendy Rawlings to show that the parties' children would suffer 
"prejudice or that the interests of the children would best be 
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served by relinquishing jurisdiction ... ." 735 P.2d 382. 
There is no evidence before this Court that the parties' 
children were in any way prejudiced or their interests 
compromised by the First District Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction in this case. In fact, the record shows that 
there were three full days of trial at which numerous 
witnesses appeared, including Wendy Rawlings, her husband, 
Wendy Rawlings1 parents, and Dr. Reiter, a psychiatrist from 
the Seattle, Washington area. 
Utah's and Washington's versions of the UCCJA call for 
cooperation between the states in custody matters. In Utah, 
Sections 78-45c-16 through 22 (Washington's provisions are 
essentially identical) provide for the ready exchange and 
discovery of information in custody cases. Those provisions 
were certainly available to Wendy Rawlings. The record 
reflects the presenting of many Washington Court documents. 
In her statement of facts, Wendy Rawlings refers to 
continuing objections to jurisdiction made at the trial on May 
21, 22 and 27, 1986. There is no record of those objections 
before this Court since no transcript was ordered by Wendy 
Rawlings. As held in Fackrell v. Fackrell, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 
39 (July 1, 1987), citing Sawyer v. Sawyer, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1976): 
Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only in 
juxtaposition to a record by which lower courts' 
rulings and decisions on disputes can be 
measured. In this case without a transcript no 
such record was available, and therefore no 
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measurement of the district court's action can 
be made as urged upon us by defendant. Id. at 
608-09. 
Without "adequate citations to the record, the judgment of the 
lower court is presumed to be correct." Fackrell, supra, 60 
Utah Adv.Rep. at 39. 
The First District Court properly exercised its 
jurisdiction in this case and its Order on Order to Show Cause 
should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The First District Court had continuing jurisdiction 
and properly retained and exercised that jurisdiction in 
issuing the Order on Order to Show Cause in this case on 
October 21, 1986. This Court should so hold and affirm the 
First District Court ruling in this case. 
Dated this 21st day of October, 1987. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
LARRY E. .J0NEIS 
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-
Respondent Mark Douglas Weiner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT was mailed, postpaid, to 
Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, at 
First Security Bank Building, 15 South Main, Logan, Utah 
84321, this 21st day of October, 1987. 
LARRY E..Jj6tf&S/ 
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-
Respondent Mark Douglas Weiner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
WEINER (RAWLINGS), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 16868 
Hearing having been set for December 30, 1985, on defendant's 
Order To Show Cause, plaintiff on December 18, 1985, filed Motions as 
follows: 
(a) For change of jurisdiction to King County, State of 
Washington; 
(b) For dismissal of defendant's order to show cause; 
(c) To continue the hearing on the matter for at least eight 
to ten weeks; 
(d) For disqualification of Judge; 
(e) A motion for hearing on disqualification of Judge; 
(f) Motion for hearing on plaintiff's motion for continuance 
and for dismissal of defendant's order to show cause. 
With regards to motions for disqualification of Judge, the 
court states: 
(a) That numerous documents appearing to be letters or statements 
j < r* f 
of both parties, requests and reports have been presented i.to ,;th§ArJ?"7-.\. ' 
Judge's secretary and the clerks of court, all of which the Judge 
MICRGriv.ED ' — ^ 
-Al- / 
has declined to receive or review, but has ordered the same\held in 
a separate file by the secretary; 
(b) The Judge has further refused to accept phone calls or other-
wise discuss or meet with the defendant; 
(c) That the Judge has advised the secretary and court clerks 
that the defendant would have to comply with applicable procedures, 
including notice to the opposing party in order to bring his requests 
before the court. 
After numerous hearings dating from the year 1981, the court has 
entered a decree, amended decree, and several orders on orders to 
show cause, the effect of which was to fix rights of visitation for 
defendant with his children, including weekly short telephone visits 
at defendant's expense which required plaintiff's keeping defendant 
apprised of her phone number and residence. Contrary thereto plaintiff 
and prior to the current disputes, notified defendant that her address 
was P. 0. Box 477, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and contact would be made 
to make suitable visitation modifications. Thereafter plaintiff 
notified the clerk's office to forward child support to Wendell 
Christensen, 519 Hawthorne Drive, Brigham City, Utah 84302. That 
on August 8, 1984 the court entered its order requiring plaintiff to 
provide an address where plaintiff resided and could be served personall 
and where defendant may visit the minor children of the parties. On 
September 17, 1985 (see Document No. 16868-83), pursuant to affidavit 
and motions, the court ordered child support payments held by the 
-A2- 21 
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clerk until plaintiff provided the court and the defendant the 
address and phone number of the children. After some delay and 
receipt of letters stating why the addresses and phone numbers 
should not be given, plaintiff did provide the court clerks such 
address and phone number and the court directed the support payments 
be forwarded to her. 
That pursuant to the plaintifffs earlier motion made in the 
State of Washington for transfer of jurisdiction to the State of 
Washington and the request contained therein that the Washington 
Court communicate with Judge Omer J. Call, Box Elder County, 
Commissioner Gaddis of the said Washington Court contacted this 
court declining to accept jurisdiction, noted the problems the minor 
children were having because of the visitation fights, and urged 
this court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing, 
adjusting or modifying custody and visitation orders. 
In view of the foregoing motions and pursuant to Rule 6 3 (b) 
U.R.C.P. the court orders that copy of such motions and the file here-
in be certified to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen for determination of the 
sufficiency of such motions. 
Dated this rO 3 <a day of December 1985. 
- A S -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
WEINER (RAWLINGS), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 16868 
The plaintiff has filed a motion for change of jurisdiction 
to King County in the State of Washington, which motion is denied, 
since Washington has declined to take jurisdiction. Plaintifffs 
Motion for dismissal of defendant's Order To Show Cause will be 
denied. Request for continuance will be granted to the extent that 
the December 30th, 1985 hearing will be vacated and set at the furtner 
convenience of the court. Plaintiff's motion for disqualification of 
the Judge will be denied, the Judge indicating by his statement ana 
order that he is not communicating with defendant and Judge Call is 
qualified to hear any further action. / 
DATED: 2 3 December 19 85. 
BY THE COURT: / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
rA Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this <y day 
of December 1985, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney "for Plaintiff, James 
M I C R O F I L M E D - ^ ^ 
j 
- A 4 -
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C. Jenkins & Associates, 67 East 100 North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan 
Utah 84321 and to Mark D. Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
Jay R. Hirschi 
Box Elder County Clerk 
By A faliUL ^ - Y/ : \ c/_ 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
WENDY MARIE 
MARK 
V. 
DOUGLAS 
CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS, ) 
WEINER, 
Petitioner, ) 
Respondent. ) 
NO. 85-3-04844-3 
ORDER DECLINING 
JURISDICTION 
Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and 
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly 
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to 
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane-
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the 
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction 
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropri-
ate judge of Box Elder County District Court; now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court 
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject to 
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the State 
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously^ ~, 
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceed-
ings; and that one of the named parties, father ofAfc'tte'iofijLldren, 
ORDER - 1 
-A6-
70 
•• ,°X' A.^.^.*-^ 
1 continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communica-
2 tion with said court it has elected and determined to continue 
3 exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and 
4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child 
5 Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box 
6| Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to 
7 have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and 
8 visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having 
9 agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and 
10 there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter 
11 by Washington Courts; and 
12 I IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings con-
13 cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed until 
14 further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for 
15 dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and 
16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this 
1M proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such 
18 I orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County 
19 District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
20 the UCCJA. 
21 
221 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Dated and signed in open this / ~^ of January, 1986 
Stephen Caddis 
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER 
71 
ORDER - 2 _A?_ 
Stephen 3ft. (Sabbts 
COURT COMMISSIONER 
KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 9 8 1 0 4 
January 13, 1985 
Venoy Christofferson 
District Court Judge 
Box Elder County District Court 
Box Elder County Courthouse 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Re: Rawlinqs v. Weiner 
King County Cause No. 85-3-04844-3 
Dear Judge Christofferson: 
Pursuant to my communication with your court in December, 1985, I 
have drafted and entered the original of the enclosed order. At 
this time I do not know what further steps will be requested of 
the Washington court, butj^ould appreciate your forwarding to the 
clerk of our court copies further substantive orders or decrees 
as may be entered in Utah respecting this family. 
^SjLncerely, * 
/ ) 
T * Stephen M/. Gaddis 
SMG/jl 
cc: Mark Weiner 
Ralph Thompson, Jr, 
Lynn Pollock 
t7 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
WEINER (RAWLINGS), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 16868 
Plaintiff filed her motion to partially set aside a Memorandum 
Decision dated December 23, 1985, by Judge Christoffersen, asserting 
that such decision was erroneously based on the State of Washington's 
having declined to take jurisdiction. 
Since the motion and the memorandum in support thereof was 
addressed to me notwithstanding the Memorandum Decision was made 
by Judge Christoffersen, I conclude from the language of the rulings 
of the Washington Court Judge that the Memorandum Decision of 
December 23, 1985, was accurately based on the Washington Court's 
conclusion that Utah was the proper forum. 
Aside from those considerations the undersigned would not 
consider it appropriate to attempt to modify Judge Christoffersen's 
IkH?-/^ 
M I C R O F I L M E D ' r~ / 
DotejVffffJteH No. D V ^ f ^' c / W*'j£--
-A9- J-93 ^ 
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Memorandum Decision, and therefore plaintifffs motion should be 
denied. 
Dated this /'-
_day of February 1986, 
BY THE COURT: 
1' / 
I Concur In the Foregoing 
Dated this 
OMER J. ^CALL^DISTRICT JUDGE 
II- I' f f rl 
!]_ day of March, *9B6.tf / iLJ-
/ r / A I / * — - • ' ! 
Ve Noy^-Gh r i s t pf fpz& e n 
District Judqe 
/ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
******************* 
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum mailed this // - day o^ 
March, 1986, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, First 
Security BanV Rider., Third Floor, '15 South Main, Logan, Utah S4321 
and to Mark Douglas Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West, Brigham 
City, Utah 84302. 
/? /< >^ /<i 
Patricia W. Parker 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
I ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d May 198( CASE NUMBER 16868 Judge Q VeNoy Chnstoffersen Ufomer J. Call Court Reporter George Parker t ^ K C & K # X Wendy R a n d a l l Court Clerk M a . r Y C. H o l m g r e n 
TRIAL: 
This is the time set for bench trial in the above entitled matter 
with plaintiff present represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell and 
defendant present acting pro se. 
Opening statements are made and Mr. Weiner presents his case. 
Defense calls Mark B. Rawlings, present husband of* Wendy Rawlings, 
who is sworn, examined, and cross-examined. 
Defense calls Wendy Rawlings, plaintiff, as an adverse witness, who 
is sworn, examined, and cross-examined. The court recesses at 12:00 noon 
with the children to be interviewed by Judge Call at 1:15 pm in chambers. 
Court resumes at 2:05 pm after the interviews by Judge Call with the 
children and the plaintiff returns to the witness stand and resumes 
testimony. The plaintiff is excused and defendant recalls Mark Rawlings 
for testimony. The witness is excused and defense calls, Judy Evans, 
former wife of Mark Rawlings who is sworn, examined and cross-examined. 
« 
Objection is made by Mr. Jewell-to the testimony of Judy Evans and the 
court overrules the objection. 
Defendant is sworn and gives testimony to the court and Exhibits are 
offered, marked and received as to both plaintiff and defendant as listed 
on the attached Exhibit List. The court recesses at 4:55 pm until 9:00 
am on the 22nd day of May. 
-AH- 213 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t and 22nd May 191 
CASE NUMBER 16868 
•WENDY . MARIE. -CHRLSTENSEN • WEINER • 
Plaintiff 
Judge D VeNoy Christoffersen X Omer J. Call 
vs. f Court Reporter George Parker XK&K(X3£}£fX 
Wendy R a n d a l l 
MARK .DOUGLAS.WEINER 
Defendant 
Court Clerk .Mary. .C.... H o l m g r e n . 
- 2 -
May 22, 1986, 9:00 am - Objections are made by Mr. Jewell to the 
entering of any of the tapes offered by the defendant and the court 
overrules the objection and will receive the tapes already submitted 
for a limited purpose. A standing objection is made by Mr. Jewell. 
Defense counsel calls the following witnesses who are sworn, examined 
and cross-examined: 
Nels Sather, associated with Bear River Mental Health; 
Thomas Charles Fairbanks, Dr. of Psychology; 
Dr. Kim Openshaw, Utah State University Family Therapist; 
Dr. Jack M. Reiter, Psychiatrist of the Seattle, Washington area. 
The court recesses at 12:00 noon and resumes at 1:00 pm with plaintiff1 
witness, Dr. Elliott Landau testifying before Dr. Reiter resumes the 
witness stand. Dr. Landau is qualified as an expert witness and is sworn 
and gives testimony. Witness is excused and Dr. Reiter resumes the 
witness stand for cross-examination, and after witness is excused the 
defense rests. 
Plaintiff's counsel moves for a direct verdict which is denied pro 
forma. Plaintiff's counsel objects to this court's jurisdiction. The 
court recesses for a five minute break and resumes at 3:55 pm with the 
plaintiff calling the following witnesses who are sworn, examined and 
cross-examined: 
Rosalie Christensen, mother of plaintiff; *} ** <1 
-A12-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
I ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t a n d 22nd May 1986 CASE NUMBER 16868 Judge D VeNoy Christoffersen iXOmer J Call Court Reporter George Parker X^RXSOlSK Wendy R a n d a l l Court clerk M a r y C. H o l m g r e n . 
- 3 -
Wendell Christensen, Father of plaintiff; 
Mark Rawlmgs, present husband of plaintiff. 
The court recesses at 5:05 pm until 9:30 am Tuesday the 27th day of 
May, 1986. 
May 27, 1986 - Plaintiff's counsel calls defendant Mark Weiner for 
testimony and submits letter by Mark Rawlings marked as Exhibit No. 16. 
Counsel for plaintiff is sworn and gives testimony as to attorney's 
fees expended by plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel recalls plaintiff and 
when the witness is excused the plaintiff rests. 
Closing arguments are made by both counsel and the court finds: 
1. Plaintiff is found to be in contempt of the court; 
2. Plaintiff does not indicate any willingness to obey court's 
court 
order and/refers to letter of October 3, 1983. As to the names of 
the children used in record keeping or the names the children go by in 
every day life, plaintiff shows no willingness to obey the court's 
order in that respect. 
3. Plaintiff indicates no willingness to obey the court's order as 
to the telephone calls and the receiving of mail as to the children. 
The court grants: 
1. Each party joint custody of the children. n1 cr 
2. School records and any other records are to be changed to the name 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN WEINER 
Plaintiff 
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d May 1986 
CASE NUMBER 16868 
Judge D VeNoy Christoffersen 2 Omer J. Call 
vs. ( Court Reporter George Parker XXKKXKMK9CX 
Wendy R a n d a l l 
MARK DOUGLAS W E I N E R ) Court c lerk • - M a r » • c • • -Holmgren. 
Defendant 
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of Weiner and the children are to be made to understand that their name 
is to be Weiner. 
3. Mental Health counseling is to be resumed for the children and 
whoever does the said counseling is to be provided with Dr. Jack Reiter's 
recommendations. 
4. Visitation for the summer is to begin with the defendant: 
Either on, 
Sunday, the 22nd day of June and run for six weeks; 
Sunday, the 29th day of June and run for six weeks; 
Sunday, the 6th day of July and run for six weeks; 
Sunday, the 13th day of July and run for six weeks; 
and on the condition that plaintiff is to notify defendant of which time 
period is to be chosen by June 1, 1986, with defendant to be notified by 
registered mail. Plaintiff to have a weekly telephone call with all the 
children and be allowed two weekend visitations from Friday to Sunday. 
If defendant moves to the Seattle area then defendant to have four weeks 
of summer visitation to be divided 2 weeks and a break and then another 
2 weeks. 
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation is to be as heretofore specified 
with children to be picked up at 3:00 pm Christmas Day and returned by 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE.OF UTAH 
WENDY .MARIE CHRISTENSEN WEINER 
Plaintiff 
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t and 2 2 n d May 198< 
CASE NUMBER 16868 
Judge D VeNoy ChristoffersenXS Omer J. Call 
vs. ( Court Reporter George Parker XX&t t f f ieXMX 
Wendy Randall 
Court clerk . .Mary .G*. Holmgren. 
•MARK- DOUGLAS- -WEINER A'i"y'\ 
Defendant 
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3:00 pm the afternoon two days before the return to school. 
If defendant makes visits to the Seattle Area he is to have six 
weekend visitations or may have instead 3 to 4 days at the November 
break of school and 4 to 5 days at the Easter break of school. 
It will be the responsibility of Mark Weiner to pick up the children 
and return for summer visitation; Mr. Weiner to be responsible for the 
Easter; November visits and Christmas and may deduct $400.00 from support 
money for the summer visitation period. Plaintiff to pay $300.00 towards 
three of the six visitations or may have $200.00 credit if children are 
delivered to Utah. 
Visitation for the 30th, 31st of May and June of this year is granted 
by the court. 
The Order that the Court signs will be enforced. 
The court will require a current and regularly updated home phone 
number and address to be furnished to each party and to the court where 
the children can be reached by both parties. 
The children of the parties are to be allowed to receive calls on a 
weekly basis with the calls, not to be monitored by any party, and to be 
for a reasonable time of 10 munutes and not to exceed 20 minutes with 
each child. Qi 7 
Mail is to be picked up and received as to each child. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t & 2 2 n d May 1986 
CASE NUMBER 
.WENDY. .MARIE. .CHRISTENSEN WEINER 
Plaintiff 
Judge D VeNoy Chnstoffersen 2 Omer J. Call 
vs. [ Court Reporter George Parker XteXXX&X^X 
Wendy R a n d a l l 
MARK. .DOUGLAS . WEINER 
Defendant 
Court Clerk . .Mary. C.. .Holmgren. 
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As to the money claims, each party will be required to pay his or 
her own attorney's fees and other bills. 
Defendant is to keep children on his insurance or if plaintiff desires 
to then plaintiff will be required to furnish a letter to the court 
stating her willingness to maintain the children on her insurance and 
to pay all costs associated therewith and the children's name of Weiner 
is to be retained on any insurance carried. 
There is to be no guardian ad litem. 
No law enforcement officers are to be brought to either home. 
Division of Family Services may be used only to enforce compliance 
of visitation. 
In the absence of a Dr.'s Certificate all of the children are to 
visit as to both parties. 
As to all other issues the Order of December 14, 1984, will remain 
in full force and effect. 
Either party to prepare Order and submit to the opposing party before 
submitting to the court for signature. 
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Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
First Security Bldg., Third Floor 
15 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No- 16868 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call 
presiding. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. The Defendant 
appeared personally. Sworn testimony and evidence was 
presented to the Court. The Court having heard the testimony 
and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and the 
Exhibits presented, including the information from the 
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the 
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and good cause 
appearing therefore, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff has continued to use the name of 
Rawlings as the name for the children. Mp.faf 
RAWLINGS FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
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2. That the reports offered by the expert witnesses 
'feg^sd^^iw^t l>ai*Jbaur„»nd Dr. Jack Reiter, are accepted by the 
Court and shall be provided to current mental health care 
providers. 
3. It is m the best interest of the children to 
terminate all litigation m this matter. 
4. It is m the best interest of the children for all 
parties to receive counselling, while recognizing that the 
best therapy is termination of all conflict. 
5. It is m the best interest of the children to 
receive regular mail and regular telephone contact with their 
father. 
6. It is m the best interest of the children that 
phone calls not be monitored by either party, except as to 
time limitation, and that any other recording, video taping or 
like method be discontinued. 
7. It is m the best interest of the children that 
there be no change m actual physical custody of the children 
but that legal custody should be vested jointly m Plaintiff 
and Defendant. 
8. It is m the best interest of the children to revise 
the visitation schedule and method of establishing the 
visitation schedule. 
9. For the emotional health and well-being of the 
children all conflicts between the litigants must be 
terminated. 
2 339 
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10. It is in the best interest of the children that the 
orders of this Court be enforced, but that no party or other 
individual or entity exert undue influence, force or control. 
11. It is not necessary to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem, 
but one may be appointed if requested by the parties. 
12. It is in the best interest of the children that no 
police officers or other individuals intervene in visitation 
except as to compel reasonable compliance with the orders of 
this Court. 
13. None of the claims of either of the parties for 
medical bills or attorney's fees shall be allowed; and each 
party shall bear his or her expenses. 
14. There is insufficient evidence of a substantial 
change in circumstances to warrant any chahge in child support 
paid by Defendant. 
15. Defendant is obligated to provide medical insurance 
for the children but said insurance and all medical expenses 
can be provided by the Plaintiff at her own expense if she so 
desires, and after notice to Defendant. 
16. Transportation expenses for visitation should be 
modified. 
17. All other orders and provisions of the Court shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
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WHEREFORE, the Court having heretofore entered its 
Findings and Facts, now enters its 
(c 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be held in contempt of Court for 
failing to obey the order of this Court to discontinue the use 
of the Rawlings name as the name for the children. 
2. The reports offered by expert witnessaf^zfirr 
SU^H-m*'\~_l,rmJ^iL-A^ Dr. Jack Rieter shall be used by the Court 
and current family therapy providers. 
3. Jurisidiction lies with this Court to hear this 
action. 
4. There haveyisubstantial changes in circumstances 
since the Decree of Divorce was entered and since the previous 
order of the Court was entered, which substantial changes 
necessitate a modification of the Divorce Decree pursuant to 
the Findings of Fact asistated above. 
IIS o^ - ' 
''rd^^ 
DATED this j „_ day of ^5?77 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Confirmed copies mailed this 
date to Stephen W. Jewell and 
Mark D. Weiner by: 
Mary q/mHolmgren^/ Deputy 
Tmer J . C a l 
D i s t r i c t J i i dge 
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Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
First Security Bldg., Third Floor 
15 South M a m 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
CiVil No. 16868 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call 
presiding. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. The Defendant 
appeared personally. The Court having heard sworn testimony 
and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein 
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the 
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the 
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: /^?~ / 
W
' C R O F I L W E D 
RAWLINGS OTSC 
.»-*.*-
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1. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held m contempt of 
Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the 
Court to discontinue the use of the Rawlmgs name for the 
children. 
2. The name of the children is Werner and there shall 
be no use by the Plaintiff of the Rawlmgs' name as the last 
name of the children, either for scjhool records, medical „ ,J; r^u 
records, or otherwise. , j^^UtL^\ yy^^t^udf +e ^<f<^t rU ,w->~* „C> JL*^*^ fw^ 
3. The reports of E t o ^ S : g ^ : = : ^ ^ H ^ t f ^ Dr. Jack Qz3^ 
Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care 
providers for their review and consideration. 
4. Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and 
by the Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn 
Eshelman or such other qualified mental health care provider 
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with 
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant. The Court specifically orders 
that once said mental health care provider is selected by 
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an 
order of the Court. Therapy will continue until terminated by 
the Court on the recommendation of the therapists. Should the 
therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the 
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition 
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another 
mental health therapist. 
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5. All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the 
children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and 
delivered/rto the children, whether said mail is sent first 
class or registered. 
6. Each party shall provide the other party and the 
Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number 
and address* During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably 
inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall 
provide an address and telephone number where the children can 
be reached. 
7. There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or 
other recording of conversations or video taping^ <- ' 
8. It is the order of the Court that telephone 
conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty (20) 
^ minutes long. 
 , . „ 
9. Legal custody of the minor children of the parties 
shall be jointly vested m each of the parties, with Plaintiff 
being granted primary physical custody of the children with 
visitation to Defendant as herein provided. 
10. Defendant shall be granted visitation with the 
children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the 
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance m 
determining visitation arrangements: 
A. During the children's school summer vacation, 
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous 
-A2 3- 7«J 4 
weeks. For 1986 said visitation shall begin,on 
June 22 for^ six (6) weeks,/ on June 29 for six 
(6) weeks, on July 6 for six (6) weeks, or on 
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the discretion of 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Defendant 
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said 
visitation shall begin, and on each year 
thereafter on or before June 1. Said 
visitation to be scheduled m future years 
shall substantially comply with the order 
as as stated above. Said^six J 6) weeks 
visitation shall begin Is&dztizF? Jat 5:00 p.m., 
and continue for six (6) weeks to the sixth 
SspS&y at 5:00 p.m. 
During said six (6) week visitation, Plaintiff 
shall be granted at least weekly telephone 
conversations with each of the children and 
shall be allowed visitation for at least two 
(2) weekends, beginning Friday at 5:00 p.m., 
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the visitation schedule on or 
before June 1, 1986, and subsequent years, by 
registered mail. Said visitation may be 
exercised by Plaintiff ojg^ fcsgx^ p^^ i e •» L-ti, JtfCf&li uX J 
and JQrwjadjljag==f^^ and the children 
shall be picked up and returned to Pr:l']gJwm ~lu/ 2^^** 
<gg£&f~ with no other restrictions except as ' 
stated herein. 
/ 
n 
KJ 
6.^*7 
Defendant shall be allowed further visitation 
of four to five (4 to 5) days during the 
children's school Easter vacation m the 
spring and three to four (3 to 4) days during 
October or November as is allowed by the 
children's school vacation as scheduled, not 
to include Thanksgiving. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the dates and times such visitation 
shall take place by registered mail at least 
sixty (60) days prior to said visitation, or 
when the school schedule is available. Said 
visitation shall m no way interfere with 
regularly scheduled school. 
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation shall 
continue as provided in previous orders of the 
Court. 
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11. Travel expenses for all visitation, including 
picking up the children m Washington and returning them to 
Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the 
responsibility of Defendant. Defendant shall be entitled to 
deduct from child support payments a total of $300.00 per year 
for all visitation and travel expenses. If Plaintiff delivers 
the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from 
Brigham City for any visitation, Defendant shall be entitled 
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than 
$300.00. Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce 
child support obligations by $400.00 during summer visitation. 
12. There shall be no other changes in child support 
paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses. 
13. All repeated conflict and emotional distress and 
strain shall be discontinued by the parties. 
14. No police officers or other individuals shall 
intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this 
order. Washington Social Services or such other qualified 
agency shall be allowed to assist m compelling compliance of 
the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency 
after a proper review. The Court will allow reasonable 
exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is 
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's 
certification. 
5 
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15. Defendant shall continue to be responsible for and 
maintain health insurance coverage for the children. If 
Plaintiff desires to obtain medical insurance and provide 
insurance and health care coverage, Plaintiff is allowed to 
provide the same at her own expense. If Plaintiff so elects, 
she shall inform the Defendant thereof in writing and 
Defendant shall thereafter be relieved of further duty and 
obligation to provide health insurance or medical coverage. 
16. Neither of the parties shall be allowed to recover 
for costs and expenses m this action, whether travel, 
medical, legal or otherwise, and each party shall bear his or 
her own costs and expenses incurred m this action and prior 
hereto. 
17. All other requests and motions of Defendant except 
as herein specifically provided shall be and are hereby 
denied. 
20. All other orders of the Court as previously entered 
and not modified by this order shall stand as otherwise 
provided. 
y 
DATED this ""day of _ 
Confirmed copies mailed this date 
to Stephen W. Jewell and Mark 
D. Werner by: 
rn^j <£. 7 ^ - ^ ^ A 
Mary^/C. Holmgren-peputy 
BY THE COURT 
Omer J. Cal 
District Judge 
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